EXCHANGE CONTROL RISK IN EURODOLLAR DEPOSITS:
A LAW AND ECONOMICS PERSPECTIVE
JOsf IBIETATORREMENDfAt
In October 1983, facing immense capital flight and growing
political unrest,' the Philippine government imposed exchange
controls 2 on Eurodollar deposits3 held in banks located in the
Philippines. The controls required banks to seek government
approval for any capital outflows. 4 Similar concerns had led the
government of Mexico to impose controls on Eurodollar deposits
held in its banks in August 1982.' So called "Mexdollar" deposits
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by Profs. Friedrich Kilbler and RichardJ. Herring. I thank them for their help in its
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1Rumors of capital controls in June of 1983 triggered a massive capital outflow
from the Philippines, which was accelerated by the assassination of opposition leader
Benigno Aquino on August 21. See CitibankMove In PhilippinesDebated, AM. BANKER,
Jan. 20, 1984, at 2, 2; see also infra notes 79-80 and accompanying text. Capital
controls are government restrictions on the flow of investment funds into and out of
a country. See FREDERIC S. MISHKIN, THE ECONOMICS OF MONEY, BANKING, AND
FINANCIAL MARKETS 496 (3d ed. 1992). Any investment subject to such controls can
lose most if not all of its liquidity. See infra note 40 and accompanying text
(discussing loss of liquidity). It is interesting to note that the deposits placed by Wells
Fargo Asia Ltd. with Citibank Manila were made in June of 1983, just when unrest
was growing in the Philippines. See infra note 76 and accompanying text.
2 Exchange controls are government regulations directed at managing foreign
exchange and controlling the flow of a country's local currency as well as its foreign
exchange holdings. See NICHOLAS L. DEAK & JOANNE CELUSAK, INTERNATIONAL
BANKING 159 (1984). Although they do not necessarily deprive a holder of foreign
exchange of her property, controls do severely hamper accessibility, resulting in a
diminution in value. The situation is comparable to a depositor holding an account
in a bank that has temporarily shut its doors. The knowledge that the deposit still
exists is little consolation to the depositor who cannot access that deposit.
' A Eurodollar deposit is a deposit denominated in U.S. dollars held by a bank
located outside of the United States. SeeJ. ORLN GRABBE, INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL
MARKETS 14 (2d ed. 1991). While any currency could be a "Euro" currency, the only
requirement being that it is held outside of the issuing country, the market is
dominated by the dollar. See id. at 15 (listing the market share of the dollar as 60%
of the Eurocurrency market).
4 See Wells Fargo Asia Ltd. v. Citibank, N.A., 612 F. Supp. 351, 354-55 (S.D.N.Y.
1985) [hereinafter WFAL 1]. In contrast to the controls imposed in the Mexican
cases, see infra text accompanying notes 116-18, the Philippine controls were targeted
at interbank deposits. See infra text accompanying note 80.
5 See Braka v. Bancomer, S.A., 589 F. Supp. 1465, 1467 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), aff'd, 762
F.2d 222 (2d Cir. 1985) (discussing government response to severe pressure on the
Mexican peso in foreign exchange markets); see alsoAlan Riding, Crisisin Mexico Costs
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could only be withdrawn in pesos, at an exchange rate pegged
approximately thirty percent lower than the prevailing market
exchange rate.6 In both countries, depositors faced a sudden loss
of assets or, at the least, greatly reduced access to their funds.
Controls such as these are internationally accepted as a method
of economic self-preservation. 7 In fact, most countries of the world
have some sort of exchange control.8 Usually, such controls are
part of a country's business environment, taken into account when
foreign investors contemplate investing in the country. The sudden
imposition of new controls, while not as drastic a step as expropriation,9 can wreak havoc on individuals and institutions holding
Investors in U.S. Millions, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 1982, at Al (discussing loss to
American investors in Mexican instruments as a result of the exchange controls). For
a discussion of the specifics of the Mexican exchange controls, see Fernando A.
Vizquez Pando, Legal Aspects of Mexican Exchange Controls, 18 INT'L LAw. 309, 311-21
(1984); Stephen Zamora, Peso-DollarEconomics and the Imposition of Foreign Exchange
Controls in Mexico, 32 AM.J. COMP. L. 99, 105-13 (1984). Zamora also discusses the
more liberal controls imposed in December 1982. See id. at 115-20.
6 See Riding, supra note 5, at Al. Subsequently, the gap widened as the Mexican
peso dropped further in value relative to the dollar. See Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A.,
764 F.2d 1101, 1106 n.2 (5th Cir. 1985) (noting that the market exchange value of the
peso fell from 114 pesos to the dollar in August 1982 to 130 in November 1982).
7 The Callejo court cited the Restatement with approval:
"[T]he application to an alien of a requirement that foreign funds held
within the territory of the state be surrendered against payment in local
currency at the official rate of exchange is not wrongful under international
law, even though the currency is less valuable on the free market than the
foreign funds surrendered."
Callejo, 764 F.2d at 1117 n.21 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 198 cmt. b (1965)).
8 See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, EXCHANGE ARRANGEMENTS AND
EXCHANGE RESTRICTIONS: ANNUAL REPORT 1991, at 580-85 (1991) (listing over 120

countries with some type of exchange control). Countries with controls run the
gamut from industrialized, to industrializing, to third-world. See e.g., William F.
Atkin, The Recent Liberalization of Exchange Controls and Its Legal Impact on Doing
Business in Taiwan, 1988 B.Y.U. L. REV. 591,593-97 (discussing exchange controls in
Taiwan); Orlando A. GonzAles-Arias, Spain Liberalizes Its Exchange Control Laws, 21
INT'L LAW. 1199, 1200-04 (1987) (discussing exchange controls in Spain); B.L.
Ngenda, An Overview of Zambia's Exchange ControlLaws, 18 INT'L-BUS. LAw. 327,32729 (1990) (discussing exchange controls in Zambia).
9 Expropriation is the forcible seizure by a government of assets from an entity
under its jurisdiction. See M. Ann Hannigan, Note, UnitedStates Home Bank Liability
for Foreign Branch Deposits, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 735, 735 n.3. When the entity is a
bank, it is usually accompanied by the freezing, if not the outright repudiation, of
deposits. See id.; see also, e.g., Vishipco Line v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 660 F.2d
854-56 (2d Cir. 1981) (involving the expropriation of Chase Manhattan's Saigon
branch by North Vietnam), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 976 (1982); Edelmann v. Chase
Manhattan Bank, N.A., 668 F. Supp. 99, 100-01 (D.P.R. 1987) (involving the
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funds in a country, as well as create instability in global monetary
markets.
It is this "sovereign risk,"10 the risk that government action will
impede the repatriation of funds held in Eurodollar accounts, that
is the subject of this Comment. Once such action has been taken,
courts must determine which party, the depositor or the bank, will
bear the loss. This Comment examines situs, the current method
courts use to "locate" a deposit, which in turn drives the determination of which party will lose. Arguing that this approach is flawed,
given the realities of the Eurodollar market, the Comment proposes
a method of allocating such a loss based on economic analysis.
Part I examines the distinctive characteristics of the Eurodollar
market. This is followed by a discussion of the current law of debt
situs, and a critique of its application in the context of Eurodollars.1 1 After examining some of the litigation spawned by the
Philippine 12 and Mexican 13 exchange controls, as well as applicable law and economics principles, 14 this Comment discusses the
expropriation by the Cuban government of Chase Manhattan's branch deposits in
Cuba), rev'd and remanded, 861 F.2d 1291, 1291 (1st Cir. 1988).
10 While sovereign risk more accurately describes the risk of loss when lending to
a foreign government, see PANCRASJ. NAGY, COUNTRY RISK 1 (1984), it will be used
in this paper as it comports with the language used in the Wells Fargolitigation. See
WFAL I, 612 F. Supp. 351, 353 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); see alsoJote Kassa, Note, A Safety Net
for the EurodollarMarket?: Wells Fargo Asia Ltd. v. Citibank, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 126,
129 n.24 (1990) ("Sovereign risk is narrowly defined as the risk of loss when lending
to a foreign government."). The more accurate term to describe the risk in crossborder monetary transactions presented by government action is "country risk." See
NAGY, supra, at 2.
11 See infra part II. The importance of situs determination cannot be overemphasized. Under current law, the situs of a debt determines the substantive law that
is applicable to disputes concerning that debt. Consequently, the outcome of the
choice-of-law analysis will often prove to be the determinative issue in litigation over
debt "located" in a foreign country. See e.g., Noyes Leech, InternationalBanking.
Effects of Nationalizationsand Exchange Controls, 8J. COMP. Bus. & CAP. MARKET L.
123, 128 (1986) ("The trouble with reasoning on the basis of situs ... is that once a
situs12is determined, the conclusion has been stated.").
See WFAL I, 612 F. Supp. 351 (S.D.N.Y. 1985),furtherproceeding,660 F. Supp.
946 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) [hereinafter WFAL II], remandedwithout opinion, 847 F.2d 837 (2d
Cir.) [hereinafter WFAL IIl], on remand, 695 F. Supp. 1450 (S.D.N.Y.) [hereinafter
WFAL IV], affOd, 852 F.2d 657 (2d Cir. 1988) [hereinafter WFAL V, vacated and
remanded, 495 U.S. 660 (1990) [hereinafter WFAL VI], afTd, 936 F.2d 723 (2d Cir.
1991) [hereinafter WFAL VII], cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2990 (1992). For a discussion
of the Wells Fargo litigation, see infra part II.A.
" See Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A., 764 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir. 1985); Braka v.
Bancomer, S.., 589 F. Supp. 1465 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), aff'd, 762 F.2d 222 (2d Cir. 1985).
For a discussion of these cases, see infra part III.B.
14 See infra part IV.A-C. For a general introduction to the law and economics
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allocation of sovereign risk between depositors and financial
institutions and attempts to develop a rule of general application.15 This Comment concludes that, absent an explicit waiver
within a deposit agreement, courts should allocate the sovereign risk
to the banks. 16 This allocation will promote the predictability
needed for international commercial transactions, as well as provide
an equitable result for relatively unsophisticated market partici17
pants.

field, see A. MITCHELL POLiNSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS (1989);
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (3d ed. 1986). Briefly, law and
economics is the application of economic theory to the legal system. See id. at 19.
The analysis employed is of the normative type, which seeks to find the economically
correct rule, rather than positive, which merely explains the economic rationale
behind existing legal rules. See id. at 21. The law and economics approach is not
without its detractors. For a brief review of various critiques, including Neo-Marxist
and feminist, see ROBIN PAUL MALLOY, LAW AND ECONOMICS: A COMPARATIVE
APPROACH TO THEORY AND PRACTICE 60-101 (1990).
15 See infra part IV.D.
16 See infra notes 156-58 and accompanying text. For a contrary position, see
Rachel R. Gerstenhaber, Comment, FreezerBurn: United States ExtraterritorialFreeze
Ordersand the Casefor Efficient Risk Allocation, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 2333, 2372 (1992)
(arguing that the risk of extraterritorial freeze orders be placed on depositors); Kassa,
supra note 10, at 163 (arguing that a right of investors to repayment in U.S. dollars
has two consequences besides "home office liability": it decreases the competitiveness
of foreign branches and provides the safety of the American banking system "to a
Eurodollar investor who has received favorable returns by passing the regulatory
scheme"); MarvinJ. MillerJr., Note, Holding U.S. Bank Home Offices LiableforDeposits
in Their ForeignBranches, 11 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 621, 637-40 (1990) (arguing that a
U.S. bank home office should not be held liable in the absence of a prior arrangement between a depositor and the home office).
17 Defining who is an "unsophisticated" participant in the Eurodollar market is
difficult. It would defy reason to describe Wells Fargo Asia Ltd. as unsophisticated.
Around the time that the Philippines was imposing its exchange controls, Wells Fargo
Bank, the parent of WFAL, was the eleventh largest bank in the United States. See
Second Large Bank Cuts Its Prime, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 1984, at D18 (describing Wells
Fargo Bank, with $26.8 billion in assets, as the 11 th largest bank in the United States).
However, the level of sophistication of the individual investors in Braka and
Callejo, see infra notes 108-25, is not quite so self-evident. Though the amounts
involved were relatively large, $2.1 million and $300,000 respectively, see infra note
112, it does not follow that the individual depositors were sophisticated Euromarket
participants. In certain situations, wealth may be a proxy for sophistication. See e.g.,
17 C.F.R. § 250.501(a)(5) (1992) (categorizing individuals with a net worth of one
million dollars or more as "accredited investors," sophisticated enough to purchase
securities sold without registration). Given the nature of the Eurodollar market, see
infra part I, it is unlikely that mere wealth will serve as an indicia of sophistication.
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I. THE EURODOLLAR MARKET

The modern Eurodollar market was created in 1956, during the
Suez crisis," when British banks, faced with stiff exchange controls
on British sterling, began to accept dollar deposits in order to
engage in trade finance.19 The crisis ended shortly thereafter, but
the practice of accepting dollar deposits did not, and expanded into
other currencies.2" Thereafter, the Eurocurrency market grew
rapidly, reaching a size of $4500 billion by 1988.21 Approximately
22
sixty percent of this market was in dollar deposits.
The Eurocurrency market is dominated by financial institutionsit is estimated that about sixty percent of the volume is attributable
to transactions between banks.25 These "interbank" transactions
18 See GRABBE, supra note 3, at 16. Prior to the crisis, the Soviet Union had used
Eurodollar accounts in London to shield its dollar holdings from potential U.S.
action. See DEAK & CELUSAK, supra note 2, at 167. The Soviets had feared that Cold
War tensions might lead to a United States freeze of Soviet dollar holdings in New
York. See GRABBE, supranote 3, at 17. This fear was not unwarranted, as the United
States has, on occasion, attempted to advance its foreign policy through the freezing
of Eurodollar deposits. See e.g., Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v. Bankers Trust Co.,
[1988] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 259 (Q.B.) (involving litigation arising from the U.S. freeze
order directed against all Libyan assets held abroad by U.S. entities).
The cost of U.S. banking regulation also spurred the development of the
Eurodollar market. See infra notes 30-38 and accompanying text. For a broad
historical examination of the Eurodollar market, see generally W.P. HOGAN & I.F.
PEARCE, THE INCREDIBLE EURODOLLAR 12-37 (1982);JANE S. LITrLE, EURODOLLARS:
THE MONEY-MARKET GYPSIES (1975); EUGENE SARVER, THE EUROCURRENCY MARKET
HANDBOOK 27-66 (2d ed. 1990).
19 See GRABBE, supra note 3, at 17. Such financinginvolves the extension of credit
to an importer in a foreign country purchasing goods from a third country. See
SARVER, supra note 18, at 31. Before the crisis, British banks had used British sterling
to finance external trade loans. See GRABBE, supra note 3, at 16. Dollars are well
suited to such financing due to their ready acceptance. SeeJOHN C. POOL & STEVE
STAMOS, THE ABCS OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCE 44-46 (1987) (describing the rise of
the dollar standard and the resulting widespread acceptability of the dollar).
20 Markets are currently active for most of the world's major currencies, including
Deutschemarks, yen, and pounds sterling. See SARVER, supra note 18, at 277-325
(discussing the Euromarkets in the three currencies mentioned, as well as nine
others).
21See Peter S. Smedresman & Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Eurodollars,Multinational
Banks, and NationalLaws, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 733, 743-44 (1989).
22 See supra note 3.
23 See Anthony Saunders, The Eurocurreny Interbank Market: Potential for
InternationalCrises?,FED. RESERVE BANK PHILA. Bus. REv.,Jan.-Feb. 1988, at 17,17-18;
see also BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS, THE INTERNATIONAL INTERBANK MARKET: A
DESCRIPTIVE STUDY 22-23 (1983) (describing the interbank portion of the Eurodollar
market as rangingbetween 63%-78% during the years 1975 to 1981). The transaction
at issue in the Wells Fargolitigation was an interbank transaction. See infra notes 7677 and accompanying text.
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are usually for $1 million or more, and have a short duration,
ranging from overnight to six months. These deposits play a crucial
role in maintaining bank liquidity2 4 and keeping interest rates in
line with supply and demand.2 5
The other forty percent of the market is composed of endborrowers and lenders, the entities that borrow and deposit funds.
An example of a Eurodollar transaction is illustrative of the market
structure. Bank A, resident in London, takes a U.S. dollar deposit
from Corporation B, also a London resident. Later that same day,
Bank A decides to deposit the funds in an overnight account with
Bank C, based in Singapore. Still later, Bank C makes a dollar loan
to Corporation D, located in Thailand.2 6 The net effect of this
series of transfers is a transfer of funds from Corporation B to
Corporation D.
This net transfer is accomplished by the transfer of funds
between the New York Federal Reserve accounts of Corporation B's
and Corporation D's banks. 27 The interbank transaction between
24

A bank with an imbalance between deposits and loans can turn to the interbank
market to correct the mismatch. See DEAK & CELUSAK, supra note 2, at 169. The
balance between assets and liabilities is reflective of a bank's liquidity, its ability to
convert its assets (e.g., mortgages, commercial loans) into cash that can be used to
cover the bank's liabilities (e.g., deposits). See MISHKIN, supra note 1, at 24, 206.07.
25 See BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, supra note 23, at 10; DEAK &
CELUSAK, supra note 2, at 169. The interbank system also allows banks to hedge
foreign exchange positions, as well as balance their accounts when more funds are
needed to support their loans. See Saunders, supra note 23, at 18.
26 For purposes of this example, the assumption is made that the amount received
by Bank C is loaned out in its entirety to Corporation D. This simplifies reality in
two ways. First, a bank will usually keep a portion of each deposit as a reserve against
the loans it has outstanding. Such a reserve may be required by statute or may
merely be suggested by prudence. See infra notes 33-35 and accompanying text
(discussing Regulation D reserve requirements).
The example also fails to deal with the money creation that accompanies the
depositing of funds in a bank. If each bank in a given banking system keeps 10% of
every deposit as a reserve, lending out the other 90%, the system as a whole will be
able to make loans equal to ten times the original deposit, a phenomenon known as
multiple deposit creation. See MISHKIN, supra note 1, at 324-30. This assumes, of
course, that loan recipients continue to deposit their loan proceeds in the system. If
the cash sits in someone's mattress, no further expansion is possible. Estimates of the
actual multiplier, the amount of credit created by a deposit in the Eurodollar market,
range from .37 to 18. See Hal S. Scott, Where Are the Dollars?: Off-Shore Funds
Transfers, 3 BANKING & FIN. L. REV. 243, 285 (1989).
27 This transfer of funds between reserve accounts is known as settlement, the
closing out of outstanding positions between banks. The usual mechanism for
Eurodollar market participants is the Clearing House Interbank Payments System
("CHIPS") in New York. See DARA M. KHAMBATA, THE PRACTICE OF MULTINATIONAL
BANKING

153 (1986); Smedresman & Lowenfeld, supra note 21, at 745; Herbert F.
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banks A and C is only recorded on paper, or, more likely, on a
computer. The only "real" money exchanged is the transfer from
B's bank to D's bank.
A distinguishing feature of the Eurocurrency market is its
relative freedom from regulation 28 because of its existence, by
definition, outside of the jurisdiction of the country issuing the
currency. 29 In the case of dollars, the advantages can be significant. In the late sixties, the Federal Reserve's Regulation Q5 0
Lingl, Comment, Risk Allocation in InternationalInterbank ElectronicFund Transfers:
CHIPS & SWIFT, 22 HARv. INT'L L.J. 621, 626 (1981) (noting that CHIPS clears
"approximately 90 percent of all international interbank dollar transactions"). For a
judicial discussion of CHIPS, see WFAL VI, 495 U.S. at 663. CHIPS has over 130
participants, engaging on average in over 140,000 transactions a day, with a typical

daily volume of over $800 billion. See SARVER, supra note 18, at 337.
The member institutions of CHIPS can be divided between settling and non-

settling participants. At the end of the business day, each non-settlingbank calculates
its position vis-a-vis its settling partner, one of 20 such settling banks. See id. The
settling banks then settle among each other, with any necessary transfer effected by
shifting funds from one bank's Federal Reserve account to the other bank's Federal

Reserve account. See id.; Smedresman & Lowenfeld, supra note 21, at 745. Banks
that are not members of CHIPS, or of Fedwire, the Federal Reserve's settlement

system for member banks, have a correspondent bank, which is a memberto settle
their transactions.

See KHAMBATA, supra, at 153.

graphically
represented in Scott, supra note 26, at 261.
2

The settlement process is

8 See WILLIAM H. BAUGHN & DONALD R. MANDICH, THE INTERNATIONAL BANKING
HANDBOOK 25-26 (1983).
2 See id. at 26. For an overview of U.S. regulations affecting international
banking, see KHAMBATA, supranote 27, at 35-44 (reviewing the substance and underlying principles of regulatory legislation in the United States); Marilyn B. Cane & David
A. Barclay, Competitive Inequality: American Banking in the InternationalArena, 13 B.C.
INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 273, 275-88 (1990) (reviewing U.S. regulations on foreign
branches of U.S. banks); see also Pierre-Bruno Ruffini, MultinationalBanking and
Regulation: An Economist's Point of View, 5J. COMP. Bus. & CAP. MARKET L. 3,16-20
(1983) (analyzing attempts to regulate the Eurodollar market in economic terms); cf.
ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION & DEV., REGULATIONS AFFECTING
INTERNATIONAL BANKING OPERATIONS OF BANKS AND NON-BANKs (1981) (describing
banking regulations in Belgium, Luxembourg, France, Germany, the Netherlands,
Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom); Cane & Barclay, supra, at 289-315
(reviewing regulation of foreign bank branches by Japan, the United Kingdom, and
Germany); Brigid Gavin, A GATTfor InternationalBanking?, 19J. WORLD TRADE L.
121, 134-35 (1985) (advocating greater international coordination in regulating
international banking, with the treaties concerning trade as a model). Of course, a
Eurocurrency market could be stifled if a government so desired. Without
international capital flow and relatively free exchange regulations, a Eurocurrency
market would collapse. See Ruffini, supra, at 9.
50 Regulation Q, governing interest paid on deposits, is presently codified at 12
C.F.R. § 217.1-.6 (1992). In the late sixties, Regulation Q provided for an interest
ceiling on deposits. At present, interest rates are not capped-Regulation Q merely
prohibits the payment of interest on demand deposits. See id. § 217.1(b).
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placed a limit on the amount of interest U.S. banks could pay on
deposits. As market interest rates rose past the Regulation Q levels,
money was shifted from deposit accounts to Treasury bills and
commercial paper.3 ' Foreign banks accepting Eurodeposits, as
well as the similarly situated overseas branches of U.S. banks, were
able to offer higher rates, thereby maintaining their deposit
32
bases.
33
Eurodollar accounts are also not subject to U.S. Regulation D
reserve requirements.34 Banks holding these deposits can relend
as much of the funds as they desire.3 5 Furthermore, Eurodeposits
are free of deposit insurance premiums, which are required on the
first $100,000 deposited in any U.S. account.3 6 Eurodollar loans
also have lower overhead and personnel costs,3 7 allowing banks
accepting Eurodollar deposits to offer a higher rate of return to its
depositors.3 8 Increased income arising from these lower costs is
shared with depositors as well as borrowers.
Another component of the higher rate of return to Eurodepositors is undoubtedly a risk premium. This premium seeks to
compensate for the greater risk associated with keeping money in
a foreign country.3 9 Unlike accounts held within the country
31 See GRABBE, supra note 3, at 17.
32 See id.
s See Reserve Requirements of Depository Institutions, 12 C.F.R. §§ 204.1-.9,

204.121-.132 (1992).

3 See 12 U.S.C. § 461(b)(6) (1988). The Federal Reserve has interpreted this
exemption as applying to deposits payable only at an office outside the United Statesany deposit guaranteed by a domestic office must meet the reserve requirements. See

12 C.F.R. § 204.128(b), (d) (1992). For a U.S. resident to hold a deposit that is only
payable abroad, the deposit must be at least $100,000. See id. § 204.2(t). There is no

minimum amount required for non-U.S. residents. See id.
In the late seventies, the United States advanced a proposal to require banks
dealing in Eurodollars to hold minimum reserves. See Ruffini, supra note 29, at 17.
Following opposition by international financial centers, and the realization that this
type of regulation would merely shift the markets to countries that did not observe

such agreements, the proposal was dropped. See id. at 18.
35 Regardless of the regulation, a bank may feel that an informal reserve is a

prudent precaution.
36 See Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1821(a) (1988)
(creating a Permanent Insurance Fund for insuring deposits in an amount up to
$100,000). Federal Reserve regulations specifically exempt deposits which are only
repaable abroad. See 12 C.F.R. § 330.3(e) (1992).
3 See SEUNG H. KIM & STEPHEN W. MILLER, COMPETITIVE STRUCTURE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL BANING INDUSTRY 18 (1983).

38
See Smedresman & Lowenfeld, supra note 21, at 744.
39
A risk premium is the additional return required by an investor who is
assuming a risk.

See RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF
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issuing the currency, foreign governments can and do take action
against Eurocurrency accounts. When a country imposes exchange
controls, 40 the liquidity of a Eurodeposit is reduced to nil.
CORPORATE FINANCE 161-62 (4th ed. 1991). This premium is taken into account in
setting the interest rate payable on the deposit. See Ian H. Giddy, EurocurrencyInterest
Rates and Their Linkages, in 1 INTERNATIONAL FINANCE HANDBOOK § 3.3, at 3, 11
(Abraham M. George & Ian H. Giddy eds., 1983). Return will be positively correlated
with risk; the riskier an asset is, the greater the required return. This is one of the
basic premises of the capital asset pricing model, which seeks to determine the price
of an asset by calculating how much of a risk premium the asset should pay over and
above the risk-free rate. See BREALEY & MYERS, supra,at 162. A risk premium should
be evident in any investment that is not risk free, with the standard definition of risk
free being short-term U.S. government debt. See id. at 161. The use of U.S.
government notes is strictly pragmatic-if the United States ever defaults, there will
be more things to worry about than risk-return ratios.
Whether this risk premium exists in Eurodollar interest rates is debatable.
Witness the behavior of Citibank in the Wells Fargo litigation. At the time Wells
Fargo placed its deposit, Citibank was offering the same rate to depositors in Manila
as it was to depositors in London. See WFAL II, 660 F. Supp. at 950; see also
Saunders, supra note 23, at 21-22 (discussing the results of a study intimating that
spreads were too narrow to account for a risk premium). If there is no difference
between London and Manila interest rates, it is difficult to argue that a risk premium
is a component of the rates. But see infra note 87 (discussing an alternative reason
for the equality in interest rates).
40 A country might impose controls for numerous reasons. The most common
include responding to a short-term fiscal crisis or implementing an economic
development plan. See DEAK & CELUSAK, supra note 2, at 159-60; see also COURTNEY
BLACKMAN, MANAGING FOREIGN EXCHANGE RESERVES IN SMALL DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES 1-16 (1982) (discussing the necessity of controls in maintaining a
developing country's foreign exchange reserves).
The Mexican exchange controls of 1982 are a paradigmatic example of controls
implemented in the midst of an exchange crisis. See BUSINESs INT'L CORP., GUIDE TO
EXCHANGE CONTROLS IN 25 COUNTRIES 62-63 (1982). The government of Mexico,
which earned most of its foreign exchange from the sale of oil, was faced with falling
oil prices in mid-1982, placing a severe strain on its ability to generate foreign
exchange. See Braka v. Bancomer, S.A., 589 F. Supp. 1465, 1467 (S.D.N.Y. 1984),
aff'd, 762 F.2d 222 (2d Cir. 1985). The controls imposed in early September
designated a two-tier exchange rate, including mandatory conversion of Eurodeposits
held by nonresidents at the ordinary rate, resulting in an immediate loss of
approximately 30% of a Eurodollar deposit's value. See id. at 62, 67; Riding, supra
note 5, at Al (reporting that Americans have lost "hundreds of millions of dollars"
as a result of Mexican exchange controls); see also Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A., 764 F.2d
1101,1104 (5th Cir. 1985) (characterizing the regulations as "a Montezuma's revenge
on American investors who had dollar deposits in Mexican banks").
Any windfall to a depository institution was quickly confiscated by the Mexican
government when it nationalized local commercial banks shortly after the new
exchange controls were declared. See id. at 1106. This bank nationalization, coming
hard on the heels of the devaluation, sounds suspiciously like an expropriationMexico acquired dollars at a rate lower than the market rate. The International
Monetary Fund, however, ruled that the Mexican controls were valid exchange
controls. See id. at 1119; see alsoJoseph Gold, "ExchangeContracts,"Exchange Contro4

600

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 141:591

Another risk in maintaining a Eurocurrency account is the
question of central bank intervention, or lack thereof. While a
central bank would aid a domestic branch caught in a liquidity
crunch, it is questionable whether it would do the same if the
crunch was precipitated in the bank's foreign branches. 41 Thus,
a Eurocurrency depositor may be faced with a greater risk of bank
failure since the bank taking the Eurocurrency deposit may not be
"backed up" by a country's central bank.
This freedom from costs imposed in the United States, plus the
added risks, will result in a narrower spread between the rate banks
42
will pay on deposits and the rates they will charge borrowers.
This narrower spread is imposed by arbitrage principles-the
numerous investors and borrowers in the market will take advantage
of any pricing discrepancy up to the point at which the discrepancy
no longer exists. 45 Consequently, profit margins in the Eurocur44
rency markets are narrower, making it a high-volume business.
To summarize, the Eurocurrency market can be characterized as
a broad, fast-moving, virtually unregulated market. Interest rates on
and the IMF Articles of Agreement, 33 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 777, 781-84, 789-92 (1984)
(discussing section 2(b) of IMF Article VIII, which voids any exchange contract that
is contrary to an IMF member's exchange controls).
In a marked reversal of policy, the Mexican government has recently begun to
reprivatize the Mexican banking system. See Tom Brown, Mexico Sells a State-Owned
Bank, PHILA. INQ., Oct. 29, 1991, at E9. Bancomer, the defendant bank in both Braka
and Callejo, was just recently returned to private hands. See id.
For further commentary on Mexico's exchange controls vis-a-vis IMF regulations,
see Stephen Zamora,Exchange Control inMexico: A CaseStudy in the Application ofIMF
Rules, 7 Hous. J. INT'L L. 103 (1984) (reviewing the implementation of Mexican
exchange controls and their relation to the International Monetary Fund Agreement).
41 See Giddy, supra note 39, § 3.3, at 10; see also Ulrich Hess, The Banco Ambrosiano
Collapseand the Luxury ofNational Lenders of Last Resort With InternationalResponsibilities, 22 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 181, 187 (1990) ("[N]o evidence exists of an
international custom establishing an obligation for national lenders of last resort to
pay foreign creditors of foreign subsidiaries of failed banks.").
42 See Smedresman & Lowenfeld, supra note 21, at 744. Free from the costs of
regulations, banks can pay higher interest rates to depositors, as well as charge less
for the loans they make. See SARVER, supra note 18, at 17-18, 24-25. Where the
savings generated by lower costs ends up-with the depositor, the bank, or the
borrower-is up to the market to decide.
43 See SARVER, supra note 18, at 17-18; see also BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS, supra
note 23, at 10 (reviewing why non-bank depositors and borrowers might discriminate
between banks).
44 See BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS, supra note 23, at 14-15 (noting the low
profitability of money-market operations and linking the bank success to predictions
of interest rate changes); Nicolas A. Saade Jr., How Banks Can Live with Low Spreads,
EUROMONEY, Nov. 1981, at 139, 139 (describing high volume of transactions in
Eurocredit markets and explaining how banks cope with generally low profit margins).
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Eurocurrencies are more attractive than those in the currency's
home country. Competition is strong, with thin margins providing
financial institutions little cushion in their transactions. Compared
to this robust market, the concept of situs is archaic, 45 vainly
attempting to place the ephemeral.4 6
II. THE DOCTRINE OF DEBT SITUS

Courts dealing with debt disputes have resorted to the concept
of situs, where the debt is "located," when determining whether or
not a bank is liable for a debt when litigation arises.4 7 The situs
of the debt is often dispositive-the law of the location will apply in
determining the liability between a depositor and a bank. 48 Situs,
in fact, acts as a choice of law mechanism. Its territorial approach
has a mechanistic quality that sets it apart from the predominant
choice of law method, governmental interest analysis. 49 While it
has been proposed that some type of interest analysis be adopted in
lieu of situs,50 this Comment proposes a rule based approach,
45 The rules of situs in American law can be traced back to justice Story's treatise
on conflicts. See Robert C. Alden, Note, Modernizing the Situs Rule for Real Property
Conflicts, 65 TEX. L. REV. 585, 585 & n.1, 587-91 (1987) (citing JOSEPH STORY,
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (photo. reprint 1972) (1834), and
describing the history of lex situs in the United States).
46 See Richard J. Herring, Comment, in PROTECTIONISM AND INTERNATIONAL
BANKING 62, 69 (Gerhard Fels & George Sutija eds., 1991) (noting that "[t]he
emphasis on situs implicitly treats a Eurodollar deposit as if it were ... some ...
commodity
that has an unambiguous location").
47
See James A. Johnson, Note, Act of State: The Fundamental Inquiy of Situs
DeterminationforExpropriatedIntangibleProperty: Braka v. Bancomer, S.N.C., 11 N.C.
J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 121, 124-25 (1986) (noting that a situs determination is
essential for determining the status of intangible property). The concept of situs has
attracted a substantial amount of negative commentary. See, e.g., P.J. Rogerson, The
Situs of Debts in the ConflictofLaws-Rllogica4 Unnecessay,andMisleading,49 CAMBRIDGE
L.J. 441, 441-44, 453-60 (1990) (discussing British law); Karen L. Goldthwaite,
Comment, Recent Approaches to Situs of Debt in Act of State Decisions, 1 CoNN.J. INT'L
L. 151, 182-83 (1986) (proposing a "factors analysis" test for determining debt situs);
Margaret E. Tahyar, Note, The Act of State Doctrine: Resolving Debt Situs Confusion, 86
COLUM. L. REV. 594, 594-611 (1986) (arguing that current debt situs rules are
inadequate and advocating the "incidents of the debt" approach as more in keeping
with the act of state doctrine).
48 See Leech, supra note 11, at 128.
49 See, e.g., Larry Kramer, Rethinking Choice of Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 278
(1990) (describing Brainerd Currie's governmental interest analysis approach as
"probably... the dominant choice of law theory among academics")
50 See e.g., H. Thomas Byron, III, Comment, A Conflict of Laws Modelfor Foreign
Branch Deposit Cases, 58 U. CIl. L. REV. 671, 693-701 (1991) (advocating the use of
interest analysis in foreign branch deposit cases); see alsoAlden, supra note 45, at 619-
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using an economic analysis that removes the choice of law question.51 The difficulties with situs are further amplified by the
inconsistent statements of the doctrine used by courts that have
addressed the issue. 52 Unless situs has been determined via
contractual agreement, 53 courts have applied one of three tests:
domicile, complete fruition, or incidents of the debt.
A. The Domicile Test

The domicile test, developed in Harris v. Balk, 54 a 1905 Supreme Court debtor-creditor case, was the first situs test promulgated by American courts. Traditionaljurisdictional principles allowed
a state court to extend personal service to a debtor if the debtor was
within the territorial jurisdiction of a state. 55 The Harris Court
expanded on this principle by holding that a state having jurisdiction over the debtor also acquires jurisdiction over the debt-that is,
56
situs follows the debtor.
In foreign branch liability litigation, the domicile test has a
pernicious effect in expropriation cases. The situs of the debt when
a foreign branch is expropriated remains in the foreign country,
thus extinguishing the debt.57 However, if a branch closes before
20, 631-33 (arguing that lex situs in real property cases should be replaced with an
explicit interest analysis).
51 See infra part IV.D. The rule approach is closer to the positions of Professors
Ehrenzweig and Reese. See Albert A. Ehrenzweig, A ProperLaw in a Proper Forum:
A "Restatement' of the "Lex Fori Approach," 18 OKLA. L. REV. 340, 344 (1965) ("Our
first quest is for a true rule .... ."); Willis L.M. Reese, ChoiceofLaw: Rules or Approach,
57 CORNELL L. REv. 315, 333 (1972) (arguing that "the formulation of rules should
be as much an objective in choice of law as it is in other areas of the law").
52 This proliferation of tests has led to inconsistent results, detrimental to the
smooth flow of commercial transactions. Confusion over which test to apply occurs
even within the same circuit. CompareBraka v. Bancomer, S.N.C., 762 F.2d 222, 224
(2d Cir. 1985) (applying complete fruition test; holding that bank is not liable) with
Vishipco Line v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 660 F.2d 854, 862 (2d Cir. 1981)
(applying domicile test; holding that bank is liable).
55 See e.g., WFAL V, 852 F.2d 657, 660 (2d Cir. 1988); Allied Bank Int'l v. Banco
Credito Agricola de Cartago, 757 F.2d 516, 521-22 (2d Cir.) (considering New York
to be the situs of the debt since it was designated the place of repayment), cert.
dismissed, 473 U.S. 934 (1985).
54 198 U.S. 215 (1905).
51 See id. at 221.
" See id. at 222-23.
57 See Perez v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 463 N.E.2d 5, 10-11 (N.Y. 1984)
(holding that since defendant bank's Cuban branches were operating at the time of
their expropriation, the situs of plaintiff's deposits was Cuba).
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action is taken, the debt situs will "spring back" to the home
58
office.
The Second Circuit applied the domicile test in Vishipco Line v.
Chase ManhattanBank, N.A. 59 The plaintiff purchased a certificate
of deposit from defendant bank's Saigon branch in the last days of
the Vietnam conflict. 60 A week before Saigon fell, Chase Manhattan closed down its branch; the Vietnamese government confiscated
the branch shortly thereafter. 61 The court held that Chase's
withdrawal from Saigon before any government action had the
effect of shifting the debt's situs to New York.6 2 The actions by
the Vietnamese government did not release Chase from its
63
obligation to repay its depositors.
B. The Complete Fruition Test
Under the complete fruition test, the situs of the debt depends
on whether a taking came to "'complete fruition within the
dominion of the [foreign] government.' 64 The test has two
58 See Vishipco Line v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 660 F.2d 854, 863 (2d Cir.
1981) (holding that situs had "sprung back" to defendant's New York headquarters
since its Saigon branch closed before any government action); Patrick Heininger,
Liability of U.S. Banks for Deposits Placed in Their Foreign Branches, 11 LAW & POL'¢
INT'L Bus. 903, 975 (1979) ("[lIf the branch is closed.., the situs of the debt...
[will] spring back and cling to the home office."). For analysis of Vishipco, see Brett
R. Turner, Note, The Harvest of Sabbatino: Vishipco Line v. Chase Manhattan Bank,
8 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 87 (1982) (detailing the Vishipco opinion and finding

it inconsistent with the Supreme Court's interpretation of the act of state doctrine).
59 660 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1981).
60 See id. at 857.
61 See id.
62 See id. at 862.
63 This results in a perverse incentive structure. Chase would have been better off
staying in Saigon and attempting to hasten government action against its branch
office. Situs would then have been in Vietnam, and the debt would presumably have
been extinguished. See id. at 862-63. Any attempt to preserve assets by preempting
government action, as Chase did in Vishipco, would result in the bank being fully
liable. For further treatment of Vishipco, see Bernadette Celentano, Vishipco Line v.
the Chase Manhattan Bank: Bank Liabilityfor Foreign Branch Seizures, 2 ANN. REV.
BANKING L. 393 (1983) (focusing on Vishipco's interpretation of home office liability
under New York law).
64 Allied Bank Int'l v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, 757 F.2d 516, 521 (2d
Cir.) (alteration in original) (quoting Tabacalera Severiano Jorge, S.A. v. Standard
Cigar Co., 392 F.2d 706, 715-16 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 924 (1968)), cert.
dismissed,473 U.S. 934 (1985). Allied Bank has been the object of commentary critical
of its application of the situs test. See Harris Black, Comment, Allied Bank
International v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago: Applying the Act of State Doctrine
to Actions Against ForeignDebtors, 13 BROOK.J. INT'L L. 183, 184 (1987) (concluding
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prongs. First, the depositor and the bank must both be under the
jurisdiction of the government that has acted. 65 Second, the situs
of the debt must be within the country taking action. 66 If both
these conditions are met, then situs is deemed to be in the foreign
country, and that country's law controls. Otherwise, situs is held to
be in the United States, and U.S. law applies.
In Braka v. Bancomer, S.N.C., 67 the Second Circuit used the
complete fruition test in determining the situs of a debt. The court
focused on the provisions incorporated into the certificates of
deposit, finding that situs of the debt was in Mexico. 68 Once this
determination was made, the court found that the bank was not
69
liable.
The flaw in the complete fruition test is obvious-it does not
really resolve the situs determination question. It merely adds a
second requirement, that the depositor and the bank be under the
foreign sovereign's jurisdiction, to the requirement that situs be in
the foreign country.
C. The Incidents of the Debt Test
The incidents of the debt test was formulated to more directly
answer the situs question. This test looks at "where the incidents of
the debt, as a whole, place it." 70 A number of factors should be
considered, including where the deposit was carried, 7 1 "the place

that complete fruition test is of little use in determining applicability of act of state
doctrine);James M. Wall, Note, Allied's Flawed Applicationof the Act ofState Doctrine:
Impropriety of the Doctrine in International Finance, 20 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 253, 254
(1987) ("[T]he [Allied] court adopted an inaccurate formula of debt situs incompatible
with the act of state doctrine's constitutional underpinnings.").
65 See e.g., Tabacalera,392 F.2d at 713-16 (holding that a Florida-based corporation
with no presence in Cuba was not subject to afait accompli by the Cuban government).
66 See, e.g., Allied Bank, 757 F.2d at 521-22 (concluding that situs of debt was in
New York, and the requirements of the complete fruition test were not met).
67 762 F.2d 222 (2d Cir. 1985), afJg Braka v. Bancomer, S.A., 589 F. Supp. 1465
(S.D.N.Y. 1984).
68 See id. at 224-25. For a more complete discussion of Braka, see infra notes 10822 and accompanying text; see alsoJohnson, supranote 47, at 124-26 (discussingBraka
and situs).
69 See Braka, 762 F.2d at 225-26.
70 Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A., 764 F.2d 1101, 1123 (5th Cir. 1985); see also
Edelmann v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 861 F.2d 1291, 1301-02 (1st Cir. 1988)
(applying elements of the incidents of the debt test in the court's choice of law
analysis).
I See Vishipco Line v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 660 F.2d 854, 862 (2d Cir.
1981) (noting that the branch that has a deposit listed as a liability on its books is said
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of payment, the intent of the parties (if any) regarding the applicable law, and the involvement of the American banking system in the
"7
transaction. 2
Unlike the complete fruition test, the incidents of the debt test
does not limit itself to what the parties have contracted between
themselves. If a court, after examining the incidents, finds that the
interests of the foreign state outweigh those of the United States,
the situs will be the foreign state, and action by that state will not
be adjudicated. 73 The incidents of the debt test allows a court to
fully account for the interests of a foreign government, thereby
avoiding any antagonism of that government.
The prevailing situs rules are ill-suited to deal with the transitory
nature of the modern Eurocurrency market. 74 It can hardly be
said that a debt "resides" in a country when the debt merely exists
as a few bytes of data in a computer database. 75 Situs is a common law doctrine, and there is nothing preventing the creation of
a new prudential doctrine, one more sensitive to the realities of the
Eurodollar market. The shortcomings of situs, and the difficulty
courts evidence in applying the doctrine, are apparent in recent
cases arising from the imposition of exchange controls in the
Philippines and Mexico.

to carry that deposit).
72 Callejo, 764 F.2d at 1123. Another possible factor is the currency denomination
involved. Some countries may wish to control their currencies more strictly than
other countries. See Tahyar, supra note 47, at 613 (stating that "the currency
denomination of the debt may be relevant to a foreign sovereign's relationship to a
debt"). If such is the case, the country desiring more control may have a greater
interest in having situs within its borders.
73 See, e.g., Callejo, 764 F.2d at 1125 (stating that Mexico's interest in the situs of
the deposits is greater than Texas's interest since the deposits were "issued by a
Mexican bank and payable in Mexico"). For further discussion of Calljo, see infra
notes 109-18, 123-25 and accompanying text.
This test does little, however, to promote consistency of result. Different courts
will balance the factors differently. Consequently, it is difficult for parties to predict
how courts will interpret their transactions ex ante.
74 For a critique of situs rules as they apply to foreign held deposits, see Byron,
supra note 50, at 686-91 (stating that current situs rules are "anachronistic" because
they preclude inquiry into other pertinent factors).
75 The existence of an inter-office component in the Eurocurrency market
complicates the equation even more. A bank can and will transfer deposits among
its own branches, depending on its funding requirements in each country. See BANK
FOR INT'L SETrLEMENTS, supra note 23, at 20-21 (estimating inter-office activity as
accounting for 38% of the "reported interbank claims").
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III. THE WELLS FARGO AND MEXICAN CASES
The limits of the territorial concept of situs are demonstrated in
the Wells Fargo, Braka, and Callejo cases discussed in this section.
In each, the court had to grapple with the location of a Eurodollar

deposit, using the tool of situs. The opposite results reached are
testament to the uncertainty under current law.
A. The Wells Fargo Litigation

In June of 1983, Wells Fargo Asia Ltd., based in Singapore,
placed two six-month, $1 million certificates of deposit ("CDs") with
Citibank at its Manila branch.7 6

This interbank transaction was

arranged by a broker, and was confirmed by the broker's telexes, as
well as by the subsequent exchange of written confirmation. 77 The
CDs were priced to yield 10% per year as an "Asiadollar" depos78
it.
Later in 1983, the Philippines began to experience a foreign

exchange crunch and investors began taking millions of dollars out
of the country. 7 9 The government responded by issuing a Memorandum to Authorized Agent Banks ("MAAB 47"), which provided:
"Any remittance of foreign exchange for repayment of principal on
all foreign [interbank] obligations ... shall be submitted to the
80
Central Bank... for prior approval."
76 See WFAL V, 852 F.2d 657, 658 (2d Cir. 1988). At the time, Citibank was one
of only four foreign banks operating full branches in Manila. See M.S. Mendelsohn,
Wells Suit Revives JurisdictionIssue, AM. BANKER, Mar. 2, 1984, at 1, 18. Only full
branches were allowed to accept Eurodollar deposits-the more than 20 other foreign
banks not operating as full branches were unaffected by the ruling. See id.
7 See WFAL I, 612 F. Supp. 351, 354 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). For the full text of the
telexes and the written confirmation slips, see WFAL IV, 695 F. Supp. 1450, 1452
(S.D.N.Y. 1988). Eurocurrency transactions are usually carried out in this informal
manner. See John E. Hoffman,Jr. & Rachel E. Deming, The Role of U.S. Courts in the
TransnationalFlow ofFunds, 17 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 493,499 (1985) (stating that
the "express terms of such a transaction are customarily stated in very brief
communications which are made either by telex or by telephone and later confirmed
by mail").
78 See WFAL I, 612 F. Supp. at 352. At the time, the rate in the United States for
CDs of the same duration was 8.85%. See id.; see also supra notes 30-41 and accompanying text (discussing reasons for higher rates for deposits in the Eurocurrency
market). Significantly, Citibank was offering the same rate for Eurodollar deposits
at all its branches worldwide. See WFAL II, 660 F. Supp. 946, 950 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
79 See Ministry of Fin. & Cent. Bank of the Phil., The Philippines: A New Beginning,
EUROMONEY, Sept. 1986, supp. at 28-29 (discussing the outflow of capital from the
Philippines in the wake of the assassination of Benigno Aquino, Jr., a leading
government opponent).
80 WFAL I, 612 F. Supp. at 354-55. The decree also provided for sanctions should
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When the CDs matured in early December 1983, Citibank
refused to repay Wells Fargo,81 claiming that it was blocked by
MAAB 47. Wells Fargo filed suit shortly thereafter.82 The district
for summary judgment,8 3 and
court denied Wells Fargo's motion
84
tried the case without a jury.
At trial, Citibank claimed that the debt had situs in the Philippines, and thus was covered by Philippine law.85 Citibank also
argued that Wells Fargo had assumed the risk of sovereign action,
in exchange for an interest rate higher than was available in the
United States.8 6 The court rejected Citibank's interpretation of
the higher rate, noting that Citibank was offering the same interest
rate in both "stable" and "unstable" countries.8 7 The court also
held that Citibank was liable even if Philippine law applied,
requiring Citibank to use its worldwide assets to satisfy the debt.88
a bank fail to comply. See id. at 355. While the remittance of principal was
controlled, no mention was made of interest. Citibank Manila continued to pay
interest on the CDs at issue. See id.
81 At the time of maturity, Citibank had not filed a request with the Philippine
Central Bank for permission to remit Wells Fargo's funds. See WFAL I, 612 F. Supp.
at 355. Only after the suit was filed did Citibank seek permission to repay Wells
Fargo. In March 1984, Citibank received permission to repay with its non-Philippine
assets (i.e., branch assets not carried in a Philippine account). See id. Thereafter,
Citibank paid Wells Fargo $934,000, extinguishing 46% of its liability to Wells Fargo,
see id.; WFAL II, 660 F. Supp. at 947, and continued to pay the interest due on the
remaining $1,066,000, see supra note 80.
82 See WFAL V, 852 F.2d 657, 659 (2d Cir. 1988).
83
See WFAL I, 612 F. Supp. at 358.

84 See WFAL II, 660 F. Supp. at 947.
85 See id.
86 See id. Citibank had made the same claim in its motion for summaryjudgment.
See 8WFAL
I, 612 F. Supp. at 356.
7
See WFAL II, 660 F. Supp. at 950. The court also found that neither party was
able to establish a custom in the Eurodollar market that would indicate where
sovereign risk should fall. See id.
While the court ruled that the equality in rates across countries was indicative
that investors were not being compensated for sovereign risk, another explanation is
possible. Professor Herring has argued that such a phenomenon can be explained
by assuming that depositors bear the risk of exchange controls, controlling their
exposure by varying the size of their deposits in different locales. See Herring, supra
note 46, at 69. While this hypothesis may explain the equivalent interest rates being
offered by Citibank in Wells Fargo,it does not necessarily offer a normative solution
to the problem of risk allocation. It is not clear that banks could not accomplish this
same result by reinvesting the deposits they take in. Citibank Manila, for example,
was able to pay 46% of the claim made by Wells Fargo by using its non-Philippine
assets. See WFAL I, 612 F. Supp. at 355.
88 See WFAL II, 660 F. Supp. at 948-50. Though the court made no mention of
the response to MAAB 47 by the other foreign banks in Manila, it is interesting to
note that two of the other three full branches were repaying their depositors' claims
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In addition, MAAB 47 did not prohibit repayment from non89
Philippine assets.
The Second Circuit remanded. 90 In an unpublished opinion,
the appellate court asked the district court to clarify whether its
judgment was based on an agreement between the parties as to
where the deposits were collectible (i.e., Manila or New York), or on
the conclusion that Philippine law governed the case.9 1 The
district court found that the confirmation slips established New
York as the place for repayment, but did not decide as to where the
funds would be collectible. 92 Applying federal and New York
choice of law rules, the court concluded that since the debt was
repayable in New York, New York law applied.93 Under New York
law, all of Citibank's assets were available for its Manila branch's
liabilities. 94 Citibank, North America, was liable to Wells Fargo for
the full amount of the CDs.
On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed, adopting different
reasoning than did the district court. By holding that a debt may be
collected wherever it is repayable the Second Circuit affirmed, as
not "clearly erroneous," the lower court's finding of an agreement
for repayment in New York. 95 The court noted further that the
lower court's conclusion that there was no agreement as to the site
of collection did not change the result. 96 Since the agreement
named New York as the place of repayment, the situs of the debt
97
was New York, and not Manila.

from their non-Philippine assets. See Mendelsohn, supra note 76, at 18. One
spokesman characterized the repayments as an attempt to keep the Euromarkets
"working smoothly," and noted that "Citibank [was] not very popular... for raising
these [legal] issues." Id.
89 See WFAL II, 660 F. Supp. at 948-49. This ruling also led to the failure of
Citibank's impossibility claim. See id. at 950-51.
90 See WFAL III, 847 F.2d 837, 837 (2d Cir. 1988).
91 See WFAL IV, 695 F. Supp. 1450, 1450-51 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (explaining the
Second Circuit's basis for remand).
92 See id. at 1452-53.
93 See id. at 1454. New York was the jurisdiction with the greatest interest in the
suit because the transaction was denominated in U.S. dollars and was cleared through
New York correspondent banks. See id. Such a holding, the court concluded, would
promote consistency in financial transactions and help maintain New York's
"'preeminent financial position.'" Id. (quotingJ. Zeevi & Sons, Ltd. v. Grindlays Bank
(Uganda) Ltd., 333 N.E.2d 168, 172-73 (N.Y. 1975)).
94 See WFAL IV, 695 F. Supp. at 1454 (citing Perez v. Chase Manhattan Nat'l Bank,
N.A., 463 N.E.2d 5, 7 (N.Y. 1984) (holding that the parent bank is ultimately liable
for the obligations of its branch)).
95 See WFAL V, 852 F.2d 657, 660 (2d Cir. 1988).
96 See id. at 661.
97 See id. at 660-61. The court quite accurately stated that situs can be varied by
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The Supreme Court granted certiorari, 98 but unfortunately

produced an opinion that provides little guidance. With an
opportunity to resolve the confusion regarding situs and its
application to Eurodeposits, the Court declined to rule on the
merits. 99 Rather, it reversed the appellate court's opinion on the
grounds that the Second Circuit relied on factual assumptions
different than those used by the district court.10 0 The appellate
court could reject the district court's findings only if it found those

findings to be "clearly erroneous," as provided for by Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 52(a).10 1 The case was vacated and remanded
10
by the Court.

2

The Second Circuit proceeded to reaffirm the district court's
After echoing the lower court's rhetoric concerning
opinion. 0
New York's "'preeminent financial position, '"' 10 4 the court proceeded to affirm the lower court's holding, agreeing with its analysis.10 5 The court reiterated its conclusion that a party could
collect a debt at the previously agreed place of repayment. 0 6 In
deference to the Supreme Court's opinion, the Second Circuit
added that it did not disagree with the lower court's finding that
10 7
there was no agreed-to collection site in the instant case.

agreement between two parties. See id. at 660. The court found such an agreement
to exist between Wells Fargo and Citibank, and thus held situs to be in New York.
Yet, nowhere in the deposit agreement is situs mentioned. See id. at 659. It is
questionable that Citibank intended the term "repayment" to be read to locate situs.
Since the majority of Eurodollar transactions are payable in New York, due to the use
of the CHIPS system, see supra note 27 and accompanying text, the court's holding
implies that most, if not all, Eurodollar transactions have situs in New York. While
this holding may have some merit as a method of determiningjurisdiction, it utterly
fails to account for the realities of the Eurodollar market.
98 Citibank, N.A. v. Wells Fargo Asia Ltd., 493 U.S. 990 (1989).
" It had been hoped that a definitive ruling by the Supreme Court on the merits
would serve as a guide for future Eurodollar litigation. See Kassa, supra note 10, at
148.
100 See WFAL VI, 495 U.S. 660, 672 (1990).
10 See id. at 670. The most honest opinion was probably the concurrence written
by ChiefJustice Rehnquist. In his opinion, he criticized the granting of certiorari to
the case as a waste of the Court's resources, as the opinion merely duplicated the
Second Circuit's decision. See id. at 674 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
'02 See id. at 674.
103 See WFAL VII, 936 F.2d 723, 724 (2d Cir. 1991), aff'g 660 F. Supp. 946
(S.D.N.Y. 1987).
14
o Id. at 726 (quotingJ. Zeevi & Sons, Ltd. v. Grindlays Bank (Uganda) Ltd., 333
N.E.2d 168, 172-73 (N.Y. 1975)); see also supra note 93 and accompanying text.
105
See WFAL VII, 936 F.2d at 727-28.
1
06 See id.
107 See id. at 728. The Supreme Court declined to review the Second Circuit's
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After seven years of litigation, no consistent principle can be
drawn from Wells Fargo v. Citibank, N.A. The opinions were highly

fact-specific-no broad overview of the special legal nature of the
Eurodollar market was made. While a narrow ruling might be more
consistent with good jurisprudence, it does little to solve the
problems of other Euromarket participants.
B. The Mexican Cases
The situations presented in Braka v. Bancomer, S.A.,10 8 and
Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A.,109 are far removed from the high finance

of Wells Fargo. While Wells Fargo involved an interbank transaction
between two financial institutions, 11 0 the Mexican cases dealt with
individual depositors in the United States doing business with the
same Mexican bank.
The two cases are factually similar."' Both plaintiffs were
U.S. citizens who purchased CDs from Bancomer's Mexico City
office between late 1981 and early 1982, with maturities ranging
from six months to one year. 112 The interest rate payable on the
CDs ranged from 14.3% to 23.25%."3
In the late summer of 1982, Mexico began to experience a harsh
economic downturn. 114 Oil, Mexico's main foreign exchange
producer, was dropping in price, and Mexico was faced with a
shortage of foreign exchange. 1 15 In response, the Mexican government issued exchange control decrees, 116 which had the effect
opinion. See Citibank, N.A. v. Wells Fargo Asia Ltd., 112 S. Ct. 2990 (1992).
108 589 F. Supp. 1465 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), aftd, 762 F.2d 222 (2d Cir. 1985).
109 764 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir. 1985).
110 See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.

I Smedresman and Lowenfeld have also classified these two cases as being quite
similar and treat them together in their article on the Euromarket. See Smedresman
& Lowenfeld, supra note 21, at 783-86 (discussingjudicial approaches taken in the
Mexican cases).
112 See Callejo, 764 F.2d at 1105-06; Braka, 589 F. Supp. at 1466. In Braka, the
CDs totaled $2.1 million. See id. Those in Callejo totaled approximately $300,000.
See Callejo, 764 F.2d at 1106.
11 See Braka, 589 F. Supp. at 1466. The Braka court speculated that these
"relatively high" interest rates were paid in order to attract U.S. investors. See id. at
1471. While the court in Callejo failed to mention the interest rates payable on the
plaintiffs' CDs, plausibly the rates were similar, given the similar duration, time
period, and the fact that they were issued from the same bank. See Callejo, 764 F.2d
at 1105-06.
14 See Braka, 589 F. Supp. at 1467.
115 See id.
116 See id.; Pando, supra note 5, at 310-11.
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of drastically reducing the value of the CDs. 117 Nationalization of
1 18
Mexico's banking system followed shortly thereafter.
Summary judgment was granted to Bancomer in Braka.1 19 On
20
appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's opinion.1
It held that the CDs, which named Mexico City as the place of
repayment, had situs in Mexico. 12 1 Bancomer's actions were valid
under the Mexican exchange controls, and thus could not be ruled
1 22
a breach.
The Callejo litigation followed much the same course. Though
it disagreed with the lower court's reasoning, the Fifth Circuit
affirmed the dismissal of the case.1 23 Applying the incidents of
the debt analysis, the court found that situs for the CDs was in
Mexico.1 24 As in Braka, Bancomer was held to have complied
125
with Mexican law, and was relieved of any further obligation.
The Mexican cases present a fact pattern very different from
that in Wells Fargo. Neither Braka nor Callejo were banking
institutions; they were individual depositors. The only similarity
between these depositors and Wells Fargo is that they had deposited
money in a bank. The differentiation between place of collection
126
and place of repayment, seemingly so important in Wells Fargo,
was not even made an issue in the Mexican cases. Viewed as a
group, Wells Fargo, Braka, and Callejo are emblematic of the fog of
117

See supra note 6 and accompanying text.

118 See Braka, 589 F. Supp. at 1467.
19

See id. at 1474.

120 See Braka v. Bancomer, S.N.C., 762 F.2d 222, 224 (2d Cir. 1985), aff'g 589 F.
Supp. 1465 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).

121 See id. at 224-25. The court explained that the CDs had "come to complete
fruition" within Mexico. Id. at 224 (quoting Allied Bank Int'l v. Banco Credito
Agricola de Cartago, 757 F.2d 516, 521 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 473 U.S. 634 (1985));

see also supra notes 64-69 and accompanying text (discussing the complete fruition
test). Situs in Mexico was contractually mandated. See Braka, 762 F.2d at 224-25; cf.
Garcia v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 735 F.2d 645, 650-51 (2d Cir. 1984) (parties
agreed to repayment at any Chase Manhattan branch worldwide, thus nullifying the
need for a situs determination).
122 See Braka, 762 F.2d at 225-26.
123 The district court had dismissed the suit on jurisdictional grounds. See Callejo
v. Bancomer, 764 F.2d 1101, 1104-05 (5th Cir. 1985).

124 See id. at 1123-24. The court identified the factors relevant to its decision as
"the place where the deposit is carried ....
the place of payment, the intent of the
parties. .. , and the involvement of the American banking system...." Id. at 1123;

see supra notes 70-73 and accompanying text (discussing incidents of the debt
analysis).
125 See Callejo, 764 F.2d at 1125.
128 See supra text accompanying note 92.
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confusion that hangs over this area of the law. A more consistent
result can be obtained if the relationship between a depositor and
a bank is analyzed in risk allocation terms, not in terms of where a
deposit is located.
IV. ALLOCATING RISK AND CRAFING A RULE
In legal terms, a Eurodeposit must be interpreted as a contract
between a depositor and a bank. 12 7 As such, the allocation of risk
and responsibility between the two parties is allocated by the terms
of the deposit agreement. 128 Law and economics principles can
give insight into this allocation process with more intellectual
coherence than the various situs rules. 129 These principles can
then be used in forming a rule of risk allocation.
A. The Coase Theorem

The Coase Theorem, developed by Ronald H. Goase in his
seminal 1960 article, 130 is the starting point for analyzing the
depositor/bank relationship. The Theorem posits that, in a zero
transaction cost 13 1 ("ZTG") world, the efficient outcome will
133
occur13 2 regardless of the initial allocation of rights.
127 See Smedresman & Lowenfeld, supra note 21, at 739.
128 See Charles 0. Hardy, Risk and Risk-Bearing,in ECONOMICS OF CONTRACT LAW

27 (Anthony T. Kronman & Richard A. Posner eds., 1979) (discussing general principles of risk allocation).
129 See supra notes 47-75 and accompanying text (discussing various situs tests).
,30 See Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3J.L. & ECON. 1, 10 (1960).
Posner describes the Coase Theorem as "establish[ing] a framework for analyzing the
assignment of property rights and liability in economic terms." POSNER, supra note
14, at 20; see also POLINSKY, supra note 14, at 11 (explaining general principles of the
Coase Theorem). For a description of the Coase Theorem, see Robert Cooter, The
Coase Theorem, in 1 THE NEW PALGRAVE: A DICTIONARY OF EcoNoMics 457, 457-60
(John Eatwell et al. eds., 1987).
Prior to Coase's article, economic principles had been applied chiefly in antitrust
litigation. See POSNER, supra note 14, at 19. The so-called "new" law and economics
sweeps much broader, attempting to cover areas as diverse as nuisance, criminal, and
family law. See id. at 19-20.
131 Zero transaction costs describes a transaction in which two or more parties can
come together and negotiate costlessly. See POLINSKY, supra note 14, at 12. In the

real world-outside the economic model-transaction costs are never zero. See
POSNER, supra note 14, at 45 (noting that excessive costs may make transacting
uneconomical). Nevertheless, the Eurodollar market, given its size, its highly
advanced communications network, and its two-party nature (one depositor deals with
one bank), comes close to the ideal. See infra notes 141-45 and accompanying text.
132 The efficient outcome is the one that is Pareto optimal, or at least Pareto
superior to all other outcomes. See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND
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A simple example illustrates this principle. 134 Suppose a
railroad track lies next to a farmer's fields. Passing trains produce
sparks, which burn the farmer's crops.13 5 The railroad company
could decrease the damage by running its trains slower, or by
installing spark arresters. Alternatively, the farmer could decrease
the damage by leaving part of his land fallow, avoiding the sparks
completely.
Assuming a ZTC world,1 36 the party with the greater economic
interest will buy out the other party. If the gain to the railroad
from running trains faster or avoiding the installation of arresters
is greater than the farmer's loss, the railroad will pay the farmer to
keep his land fallow.13 7 If the crops are more valuable than the
added cost of decreasing the sparks, the farmer will pay the
railroad. In either case, the efficient outcome will result-the only
13 8
bargaining is over the division of the economic gain.
ECONOMICS 49 (1988). Pareto optimality is that allocation of resources where no
person can be made better off without making another worse off. See id. A Pareto
superior choice makes all parties better off than does a Pareto inferior choice (i.e.,
it comes closer to Pareto optimality). See id.
A more relaxed version of efficiency is the Kaldor-Hicks standard. See POSNER,
supra note 14, at 13. Kaldor-Hicks efficiency is an allocation that increases total
benefit without regard to the distributional effect-one party's position is improved
by more than another party's position is worsened. See id. Theoretically, the winners
can pay off the losers, achieving Pareto superiority. See COOTER & ULEN, supra at 51;
Jules L. Coleman, Eiciency, Utility, and Wealth Maximization, 8 HOFSTRA L. REv. 509,
513-14 (1980).
133 See POLINSKY, supra note 14, at 12; POSNER, supra note 14, at 7.
134 The following example is drawn from Coase's original article. See Coase, supra
note 130, at 30-34. Coase drew this example from the English common law,
specifically Vaughan v. Taff Vale Ry., 137 Eng. Rep. 667 (Ex. 1858), rev'd, 157 Eng.
Rep. 1351 (Ex. Ch. 1860). For a recent treatment of this example, see POSNER, supra
note 14, at 7.
135 One might conclude that the railroad is at fault, since it is burning the crops.
But there would have been no loss if the crops had never been planted. In a general
sense, both parties are causing the damage. See Coase, supra note 130, at 2
(describing the reciprocal nature of nuisance problems). Coase argues that the
correct question to ask is whether we should allow A to harm B or B to harm A? See
id.
1- The major transaction costs in this problem are the bargaining costs of
bringing together the single railroad company with the potential multitude of farmers
who have land bordering the right of way. For another example of how transaction
costs are important, see POLINSKY, supra note 14, at 12-13.
137 See POSNER, supra note 14, at 7.
138 If, for example, the railroad will buy out the farmer, the farmer will wish to
appropriate some of the railroad's anticipated gain for himself. This behavior, known
as "strategic bargaining," can be a major transaction cost. See POLINSKY supra note
14, at 18-19; POSNER, supra note 14, at 54-55.
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The Coase Theorem is also applicable in a positive transaction
cost world. Parties will transact as long as the benefit derived
outweighs the transaction costs.13 9 Any legal rule in a positive
transaction cost world should seek to minimize such costs so that
140
parties can fruitfully transact.
B. Transaction Costs in the EurodollarMarket

The Eurodollar market, although not a ZTC environment, comes
closer to the Coasian ideal than do other markets. It is a large
market with an ample number of players. 141 With the amount of
money being transferred, especially in the interbank market, there
is no danger that a transaction will not occur because of insufficient
14 2
resources.

The communication between market members is rapid, with
information being widely disseminated.1 4 3 Bargaining is infor139 See, e.g., POLINSKY, supra note 14, at 12-13 (arguing that positive transaction
costs may lead to inefficient results due to the failure to bargain). Transaction costs
can include the costs of gathering information, identifying parties, bargaining, and
enforcing a bargain. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 132, at 100-02. If information
is distributed asymmetrically, the efficient outcome might be unattainable. It is
possible that the party with the information may seek to. maximize its own return by
not dealing and avoiding further transaction costs. See id.
Another problem is the asymmetrical distribution of wealth. If the value of an
entitlement forms a large portion of one party's wealth, that party maybe unable to
acquire the resources needed to purchase that entitlement, even if the party values
the entitlement higher than does the opposing party. See POSNER, supra note 14, at
15, 43 n.1.
140 See POSNER, supranote 14, at 505-06. Posner believes thatjudges act efficiently
when issuing their opinions, even if they are unaware that they are doing so. See id.
at 511-12.
141See supra text accompanying note 21. Because the dollar accounts for 60% of
the market, it provides the largest market. See supra note 3. A large market will
minimize the danger of strategic bargaining. When a party knows that its opposite
can easily transact with a third party, there is less incentive to engage in strategic
bargaining. Cf Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970)
(plaintiffs could bargain strategically with defendant cement plant and among
themselves since an agreement with everyone was needed).
142 See supra note 139 (discussing the problem with the Theorem when one party
lacks resources). In the interbank market, it is unlikely that a party will be unable to
place or accept a deposit because of insufficient funds.
143 See BEAK & CELUSAK, supra note 2, at 170-71. Banks have access to a number
of wire services that serve to provide them with large amounts of information on
global markets. See SARVER, supra note 18, at 341,344-46. At a cost of roughly $700,
plus communications charges, a client of American Telerate has access to 60,000
pages of financial information. See id. at 345-46.
However, a branch that is in-country could be presumed to have an information
edge on the particular social and governmental conditions within that country. See
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mal-witness the simple documentation exchanged in the Wells Fargo
case."' Overall, the market does come close to being perfect.
Theoretically, there need be no rule dealing with the allocation of
exchange control risk-the parties will always be able to allocate it
between themselves.14 5 The cases discussed evince that this is not
the current situation.
C. The SuperiorRisk Bearer
If a legal rule must be imposed, it should target the superior risk
bearer and assign the risk to that party, 146 who then becomes the
insurer of that risk. The goal should be to find the cheaper
insurer.1 47 Posner defines the cheaper insurer as the party that
can minimize measurement costs148 as well as transaction
infra notes 160-61 and accompanying text (discussing advantage of in-country banks
in assessing risk).
144 See supra note 77 and accompanying text (discussing the telexes and
confirmation slips exchanged in Wells Fargo).
145 See Coase, supra note 130, at 10. Even if there is an allocation, it may not be
provable. Wells Fargo is an example of an allocation that was not dear on its face.
Citibank argued that the depositor had been allocated the risk, see WFAL 1, 612 F.
Supp. 351, 353 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), but the exchange of telexes that constituted the
deposit agreement made no mention of any such allocation, see id. at 354, and
Citibank's statement of Terms and Conditions disclaiming responsibility, see id., was
not sufficient to avoid bearing the loss. A rule allocating the risk to one party would
avoid such uncertainty.
146 See POLINSKY, supra note 14, at 53-54 (discussing the partner-associate
relationship in a law firm as an example of proper risk allocation).
147 The cheaper insurer will be the party best able to bear the risk. See id. at 56;
POSNER, supra note 14, at 93. Posner differentiates between preventable and
unpreventable risks. Preventable risks should be assigned to the party best able to
prevent. See id. at 91. Unpreventable risks should be assigned to the cheaper insurer.
See id. at 93.
For a further discussion of the relation between information, risk, and insurance,
see COOTER & ULEN, supra note 132, at 55-70; DAVID A. LEREAH, INSURANCE
MARKETS: INFORMATION PROBLEMS AND REGULATION (1985).
148 Measurement costs are composed of the costs of estimating the probability that
the loss will occur and the magnitude of the loss if it does occur. See POSNER, supra
note 14, at 93. In the Eurodollar context, the magnitude determination is easy-it
equals the deposit at risk. As to the determination of the probability of exchange
controls, several models are available to assist in quantifying the risk. See HANs
SIEGWART ET AL., GLOBAL POLITICAL RISK: DYNAMIC MANAGERIAL STRATEGIES 75-102
(1989); Robert 0. Slater, The BootstrappingApproach: An Alternative to Old Methods
Restyled, in ASSESSING CORPORATE POLITICAL RISK: A GUIDE FOR INTERNATIONAL
BUSINESSMEN 149, 149-62 (David M. Raddock ed., 1986).
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costs.1 49 Identifying0 these costs is best done by the party with
15
more information.
Additionally, the risk bearer should be the party that is closest
to risk-neutral. 151 The risk-neutral party can accurately price a
risk without being swayed by bias towards the "sure thing." A deep
pocket is also an advantage for the risk-neutral party-if too large a
percentage of the party's wealth is at issue, bias may creep in152
D. Crafting a Rule

The search for an efficient rule that will deal with exchange
control risk must begin with finding the cheaper insurer in the
Eurodollar market-we cannot assume that parties in the market will
153
efficiently (and explicitly) allocate the risk among themselves.
Imposing a rule has the benefit of producing certainty in the
market, one of the chief policy concerns of the courts that ruled on
the Wells Fargo litigation. 154 After finding a rule, its usefulness
149 See POSNER, supra note 14, at 93 (noting that transaction costs consist
principally of the cost associated with pooling risks in order to reduce the overall risk
exposure).
150 See id.
151 See POLINSKY, supra note 14, at 55-56. A risk-neutral party is ambivalent to the
variability of a return. See id. at 53. A risk-averse party avoids uncertainty, and thus
is willing to accept a lower return if that return is certain. See id. at 53-54.

For example, consider a coin flip, with a prize of $1000 if the correct side is
chosen. The probability of either side coming up is 50%. Thus, the expected return

is $500 ($1000 multiplied by .50). A risk-neutral party would accept the contest and
only relinquish the opportunity if it is paid $500 (or more). In contrast, a risk-averse
individual would rather accept a lower sum, say $400, than risk getting nothing. See
POSNER, supra note 14, at 11-12.
152 See POSNER, supra note 14, at 15 (discussing the Wells Fargocase).
153 A basic assumption of the Coase Theorem is a perfect market, with zero
transaction costs. See supranotes 131-32 and accompanying text. Even the Eurodollar
market does not meet this ideal. In a world of positive transaction costs and asymmetric information, the efficient result may not always occur. This does not mean that
the Coase Theorem is inapplicable. Rather, given a positive transaction cost world,
the risk should be allocated to the party that most likely would have accepted the risk
in a world of zero transaction costs. This is the concept of the cheaper insurer. See
POSNER, supra note 14, at 93.
Even if the efficient allocation does occur, it may not be done explicitly, leading
to the uncertainty that gives rise to litigation. See supra note 145.
154 See supra notes 93 & 104 and accompanying text. Imposition of such a rule,
whether byjudicial or congressional action, would serve to preempt state choice-oflaw doctrine, creating a federal rule. Given the international nature of the Eurodollar
market, this is a valid exercise of federal power. See Michael H. Gottesman, Draining
the Dismal Swamp: The Case for Federal Choice of Law Statutes, 80 GEO. L.J. 1, 23-28
(1991); see also Daniel C.K. Chow, Limiting Erie in a New Age of InternationalLaw:
Toward a FederalCommon Law of InternationalChoice of Law, 74 IOWA L. REV. 165,220-
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can be tested by applying it to the previously discussed cases, and
examining the results.
1. Who is the CheaperInsurer?
Between depositor and bank, it is not readily apparent which
party is better positioned to accept the risk, especially in the
interbank market.1 55 The cheaper insurer is the one best situated
to price the risk, which involves setting the risk premium to be
charged on the account.1 56 Given the requisites of the cheaper
insurer, 157 the bank is in the better position to bear the risk of
158
foreign exchange control.
Much of what makes the bank the better risk bearer is inconclusive when both parties are banks. While banks are more risk-neutral
than individual depositors,15 9 there is nothing that makes one
bank inherently more risk-neutral than another. Similarly, one bank
is probably as much of a deep pocket as the other.
Banks accepting deposits are in a better position to assess the
magnitude of sovereign risk than are their depositors, be they
individuals or other financial institutions.1 60 An in-country bank
24 (1988) (discussing the advantages of a federal common law of international choiceof-law).
155 See supra notes 23-25 (discussing the interbank market).
156 See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
157
See supra notes 146-52 and accompanying text.
158 Such an allocation also has the benefit of forcing the country imposing
controls to bear the cost of its controls. If banks are liable for controls imposed by
a country, they will be much more circumspect in evaluating the suitability of a given
locale for a branch office. Without such liability, expansion into riskier countries is
more likely. The loss of foreign banks, and the business they bring, will enter into
the calculus of countries contemplating the imposition of controls. Cf. Gerstenhaber,
supra note 16, at 2379-83 (arguing that allocating the risk of U.S. freeze orders to
depositors would force the United States to internalize the costs of such orders).
159 As a corporation, a bank is likely to be less risk averse than an individual since
the bank owners, its shareholders, have limited liability and can compensate for any
risk the bank incurs by diversifying their portfolios. See POSNER, supra note 14, at
370-71.
160

See Irving S. Friedman, Evaluation of Risk in InternationalLending: A Lender's

Perspective, in KEY ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL BANKING 115, 119-21 (1977) (stressing

the importance to a bank of evaluating the risks of the countryin which it is situated).
Interestingly, Mr. Friedman was Senior Vice President and Senior Adviser for
International Operations at Citicorp, Citibank Manila's parent company, at the time
he wrote his article. See id. at 115.
This position contrasts with that taken by Gerstenhaber concerning depositors

at risk of becoming targets of a U.S. freeze order. See Gerstenhaber, supra note 16,
at 2377. It may well be that the "violent political groups" that trigger the imposition
of freezes may have some special relationship with the states against which freezes are
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is probably more in tune with the political and economic situation
in its country than are its depositors. Its officers will have more
contact with the country's government through their dealings with
regulators and officials. Citibank Manila, for example, probably
understood the implications of the political unrest in the Philippines
in the summer of 1983, well before the Philippine government
imposed the exchange controls of October 1983.161
Specialization is also at work here. It is cheaper for one bank to
monitor the events in a country, and set its interest rates accordingly, than for one hundred depositors to monitor those same events,
and negotiate individually with the bank. An in-country bank can
put in place the monitoring apparatus that will keep it informed as
to developments within the country.
Going beyond the question of the cheaper insurer, there is also
an equity issue that argues in favor of assigning the risk to the bank.
Such issues can be considered if the market is efficient, which allows
a depositor receiving an entitlement to sell it off if she so desires. 162 Though the equities in the interbank situation are not
clear, in cases with smaller depositors it seems fairer to place the
163
burden on the bank, barring any explicit allocation.
directed. See id. But this would not appear to be the case in the Eurodollar market
in general. The controls at issue in Wells Fargo,Braka,and Callejowere not directed
at any particular depositor. Seesupra notes 76-126 and accompanying text. There was
no reason why Wells Fargo Asia Ltd. or Messrs. Braka and Callejo would have known
more about Philippine or Mexican policies than the banks that accepted their
deposits.
161 Citibank Manila was aware of forthcoming Philippine action according to

bankers interviewed in a Wall Street Journalarticle appearing in early 1984. See S.
Karene Witcher, Wells FargoSues Citibank Over Manila Deposits, WALL ST.J., Feb. 23,
1984, at 40. The bankers alleged that Citibank sought to diminish its exposure in
Manila by replacing interoffice deposits (i.e., money deposited in Manila from other
Citibank offices in the world) with funds raised in the interbank market. See id. To
support this allegation, they observed that Citibank had been 'very aggressive'" in the
interbank market, paying a premium of as much as three fourths of a percent in the
summer of 1984. See id. The bankers also referred to a confidential report from the
Philippines central bank that indicated Citibank was replacingits internal funds with
the monies acquired on the interbank market. See id.
162 See Herbert Hovenkamp, Marginal Utility and the Coase Theorem, 75 CORNELL
L. REV. 783,809 (1990) ("[Ilf markets are working well, entitlements maybe assigned
on the basis of fairness or justice, or some similar criteria unrelated to economic
efficiency. The allocatively efficient solution will emerge nonetheless."). Thus, the
efficiency of the Eurodollar market allows one to look beyond efficiency.
163 See, e.g., Vishipco Line v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 660 F.2d 854, 863 (2d
Cir. 1981) ("U.S. banks, by operating abroad through branches, reassure foreign
depositors that their deposits will be safer with them than they would be in a locally
incorporated bank") (citing Heininger, supra note 58, at 911-12); Andy McCue,
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Any assignment of risk to banks, however, must remain
alienable. 164 Assuming for the moment that any rule would apply
only to U.S. banks, the effect would be a reduction in the rates U.S.
banks offer their depositors. As insurers, the banks would have to
discount their interest rates by the amount at which they value the
risk of exchange controls. 165 Faced with lower rates, some depositors might opt to self-insure, instead of accepting the banks'
"insurance." Others might value the risk at a lower level than the
U.S. banks and seek alternative investments. The result would most
166
likely be a drop in U.S. bank deposits.
To avoid such a destructive effect on the competitiveness of U.S.
banks, any rule of allocation must allow banks to contract away the
risk. 167 Banks would offer depositors a higher rate if the depositors assumed the risk. Thus, a two-tiered rate structure would
develop. The lower rate would allocate the risk to the bank; the
168
higher, to the depositor.
Such an arrangement would quickly begin to respond to market
forces. 169 The spread between the two rates would initially be set
by the bank. As market participants analyzed this spread, they
would form a decision as to its correctness. If the bank was
underpricing the risk, funds would flow to the lower, guaranteed
rate. Conversely, overpricing the risk would result in funds flowing
Citibank FreezesDollarDepositsin Philippines,WALL ST.J.,Jan. 24, 1984, at 37 (quoting

a Japanese banker as "argu[ing] that 'someone as big as Citibank should honor its
obligations'").
164 See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, PropertyRules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARv. L. REv. 1089, 1111-15 (1972)
(discussing inalienable entitlements). The present state of regulation over the U.S.
banking industry already functions as an impediment vis-a-vis the banks of other
industrialized countries. See Cane & Barclay, supra note 29, at 315-319. Creating an
inalienable entitlement to the benefit of depositors may act to further weaken the
competitive position of U.S. banks. Depositors that do want to assume the risk will
go to other banks.
165 A similar pricing mechanism is used to account for the added burdens of U.S.
regulations on deposits held in the U.S. See supra notes 29-38 and accompanying text
(discussing U.S. regulation of domestic deposits).
166 The failure to bear the risk of exchange controls, barring an explicit
reallocation to depositors, may also lead to a drop in deposits. See McCue, supra note
163, at 37 (noting that some bankers responded to Citibank Manila's actions by
withdrawing funds from other Citibank branches around the world).
167 The courts in Braka and Callejo concluded that such a risk transfer from
Bancomer to its customers had occurred. See cases discussed supra notes 108-25 and
accompanying text.
168 This higher rate would be the "bribe" thatbanks would have to pay depositors
to accept
the sovereign risk. See Gerstenhaber, supra note 16, at 2374-75.
169
See supra text accompanying note 43 (discussing arbitrage).
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to the higher rate. The interactions between the rates set by each
bank would produce a market-clearing spread, where each depositor, guided by her individual preferences, would allocate her funds
170
between guaranteed and non-guaranteed accounts.
Essential to the proper functioning of this system is judicial
acceptance of risk transfer. When the parties know they are
allocating a risk ex ante, and they specify their agreement in writing,
courts should be ready to accept their wishes. At times, courts have
17 1
been reluctant to enforce such risk allocation clauses.
The net effect of the proposed rule is to create a default setting
for deposit relationships that do not explicitly speak to the
allocation of exchange control risk. By creating the default rule, we
can dispense with the doctrine of situs. A bank accepting Eurodollar deposits bears the risk, unless it explicitly assigns that risk to the
depositors.
2. Applying the Rule

Applying this rule of risk allocation ex post is a difficult matter.
Above all, the rule is forward looking. Once parties know the rule
and recognize the risk, cases like Wells Fargo, Callejo, and Braka

should disappear, or at the very least become easier to resolve.
Probably the strongest argument that the outcomes were correct in
all three cases is that the interest rates truly reflected the implicit
risk allocation. In Wells Fargo, Citibank was offering one rate
worldwide, irrespective of the relative instabilities of the countries
in which it operated. 172 The lower court in Braka found the
170 This assumes that depositors are sophisticated enough to understand the
difference between the two accounts.
171 See, e.g., Trinh v. Citibank, N.A., 850 F.2d 1164, 1166, 1168 (6th Cir. 1988)
(declining to enforce a fairly specific clause allocating political risk to depositors).
Quite often, such risk allocation clauses are contained in standard form contracts,
which are often criticized as resulting from unequal bargaining power. See POSNER,
supranote 14, at 102-03. However, if a two-tiered interest rate structure develops, the
need to negotiate over risk allocation disappears. A bank would simply have two
form contracts, and would use the one corresponding to the depositor's desired risk
allocation-evidenced by the rate the depositor selects. Thus, these form contracts
would merely memorialize the risk allocation made when the depositor chooses
whether or not to be protected.
172 See supra text accompanying note 87. It is possible that Citibank was
internalizing any costs related with country risk. Citibank may have believed that it
was sufficiently diversified to the point that it did not need to set different prices.
The signal Citibank was sending to the other market participants by pricing Manila
and London at the same rate indicated that the two markets were "equivalent," which,
of course, they were not. But see Herring, supra note 46, at 69 (offering a different
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"relatively high" interest rates offered by Bancomer to be compensa173
tion for the greater risk associated with investing in Mexico.
So it is possible that this incongruous result-Wells Fargo wins,
Braka and Callejo lose-is the correct one. Between Bancomer and
its individual customers, Bancomer should bear the cost, unless
there is an explicit reallocation. Between Wells Fargo and Citibank,
it is a toss-up. Either could equitably bear the risk of foreign
exchange control. The difference is that Braka and Callejo "sold"
their entitlement to Bancomer.
CONCLUSION

A move away from situs, towards a more explicit recognition of
what goes on in a Eurocurrency transaction, would help promote
the certainty necessary for prosperous commerce.
Only by
recognizing the risk that is being transferred, and basing our rules
on that transfer, can we derive a logically coherent doctrine. The
situs rules, grounded as they are in territoriality, do not respond to
the realities of the Eurodollar market. Regarding the risk of
exchange controls on Eurodeposits, the superior risk bearer, the
bank, should bear the risk, barring any duly negotiated reallocation
to the depositor. Such a default setting would promote the
certainty necessary for a smoothly functioning system, while
simulataneously protecting the smaller depositor.

rationale for the equivalent interest rates); supra note 87 (discussing Professor
Herring's position).
173 See supra note 113. Apparently, the Braka court did not consider that the
premium might have been the result of the cost savings realized by branches
operating outside the United States. See supra notes 29-38 (discussing U.S.
regulations).

